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Abstract
Tax planners often choose debt over equity financing. As this has led to increased corporate debt
financing, many countries have introduced thin capitalization rules to secure their tax revenues. In a
general capital structure model we analyze if thin capitalization rules affect dividend and financing
decisions, and whether they can partially explain why corporations receive both debt and equity
capital. We model the Belgian, German and Italian rules as examples. We find that the so-called Miller
equilibrium and definite financing effects depend significantly on the underlying tax system. Further,
our results are useful for the treasury to decide what thin capitalization type to implement.
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1 Introduction
Seen from a tax perspective it is often attractive
for shareholders of corporations to provide capi-
tal as debt instead of equity capital. This has led
to an extensive enlargement of debt financing of
corporations (OECD 1987: 8 et seq.). To protect
tax revenues, the legislators of many countries
have reacted to this development by increasingly
implementing so-called thin capitalization rules
(e.g., in Italy and the Netherlands, see Gouthière
2005 for an overview of different thin capitaliza-
tion rules) or by tightening existing rules (e.g., in
Germany, Denmark, the UK, Spain, and France).
Thin capitalization rules are regulations that limit
the corporate tax deductibility of interest paid to
shareholders.
Moreover, we observe that corporations issue
shares as well as debt. This raises the question
of whether thin capitalization rules cancel out the
tax shield of debt financing, which may explain
the attractiveness of one option over the other.
Against this background we investigate how such
regulations affect the capital structure decisions
of corporate stockholders. We neglect problems
of information asymmetry between managers and
shareholders in the following.Hence, for simplicity
we abstract from principal-agent conflicts.
During the last few decades many authors have
contributed to the field of corporate capital struc-
ture decisions (for an overview of different capital
structure models see Myers 2001 and Graham
2006). In line with neoinstitutional theory, the
tax based trade-off theory (e.g., Myers 1984) and
the non-tax-oriented pecking-order theory (Don-
aldson 1961) have gained attention. Here, the the-
ory of Modigliani and Miller (1958) represents a
seminal work for many contributions based on
neoclassical theory. In this early work, taxes were
not included. Many extensions to Modigliani and
Miller (1958) take many different aspects into ac-
count. Modigliani and Miller (1963) extend their
model themselves and integrate, among other as-
pects, a corporate tax. Miller (1977) completes the
model anew and implements an income tax on the
shareholder level. In both approaches a classical
corporate tax system is assumed.
Furthermore, in some contributions the income
tax effects on the capital structure are modeled in
a more refined manner. For instance, capital gains
taxes and, in turn, the asymmetric taxation of div-
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idends and capital gains are highlighted by Farrar
and Selwyn (1967), Brennan (1970), and Schneller
(1980). Brennan (1970) and Zechner (1990) as-
sume a progressive tax scale and allowances for
interest paid.
Some papers take account of tax policy details
in various countries. Swoboda (1991) examines
Germany’s and Austria’s 1991 tax laws in a Miller
framework. In this context he considers Germany’s
corporate tax, income tax and also property tax, lo-
cal business tax and church tax. FungandTheobald
(1984) consider the 1984 tax laws of France, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, and the USA. Unlike
Swoboda, they restrict themselves to corporate and
income taxes. Holland and Steiner (1996) extend
Swoboda’s approach and investigate the influence
of Germany’s solidarity surcharge on the capital
structure. Laß (1999) models US tax law between
1977 and 1994 as well as German tax law be-
tween 1976 and 1998, also using the Miller model.
Kruschwitz (2007) models the German tax regime
in 2007.
Beyond detailed investigations of different taxes
there are many other extensions to the Modigliani
and Miller (1958) model. Hodder and Senbet
(1990), Graham (2003), and Desai, Foley, and
Hines (2004) consider international tax aspects,
DeAngelo andMasulis (1980a), DeAngelo andMa-
sulis (1980b), and Graham (2000) take account of
non-debt-tax shields, e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger
(1973), Haugen and Senbet (1978), Kim (1978)
model bankruptcy costs, and Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976) and Leland (1998) integrate agency
costs (see Harris and Raviv 1991). Capital struc-
ture models under uncertainty are examined by
Kim (1982), Zechner (1990), and Swoboda (1991).
Miller andScholes (1978)andLitzenbergerandvan
Horne (1978) consider dividend policy. Schneller
(1980) andGraham (2003) offer amodel that takes
account of different systems to prevent double tax-
ation of dividends. A dynamic model is presented
by Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989).
Beyond this finance-theory-oriented stream of lit-
erature we refer to the discussion on intertem-
porarily neutral capital income taxation and con-
sumption-based tax systems in public finance. The
so-called ACE tax has become particularly popular
as an investment and financing-neutral tax system
with an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) de-
ductible from taxable profits, which represents the
opportunity costs of equity capital (Wenger 1983;
Boadway and Bruce 1984; Devereux and Freeman
1991). This system is supposed to be close to the tax
politicians’ idea of a fair and efficient tax system
(Devereux and Freeman 1991: 4-6; Fehr and Wie-
gard 2003: 298). As Belgium is one of the countries
to have introduced an ACE tax and simultaneously
tightened the thin capitalization rules (e.g., Gerard
2006) it is interesting to analyze its interdepen-
dencies and possible capital structure effects.
Although the literatureprovidesdetailed investiga-
tions of tax rules, thin capitalization rules have to
date only been analyzed by Buettner, Overesch,
Schreiber, and Wamser (2006), Overesch and
Wamser (2006)andOvereschandWamser (2009).
The authors empirically investigate financing deci-
sions in amultinational firm under a restrictive tax
rule for stockholders’ debt financing, which is com-
parable to the German thin capitalization rules. In
this work, the main elements of a thin capital-
ization tax rule are considered without modeling
country-specific details of the regulation. Here,
neither a specific debt-capital/equity-capital ratio,
safe haven, nor a differentiation between profit-
dependent and profit-independent loans are car-
ried out. Amore sophisticated analysis of the influ-
ence of thin capitalization rules on entrepreneurial
capital structure decisions has not yet been con-
ducted.
To fill this void, we integrate thin capitalization
rules into a capital structure decision model in
the following analysis. We investigate its influ-
ence on corporate financing decisions analytically.
It also helps the treasury to decide what type
of thin capitalization rule to implement under a
given tax setting. Our study can be regarded as
a first step towards an empirical study on the
influence of specific thin capitalization rules on
corporate capital structure and thus provides im-
portant information to extend the work of Buett-
ner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser (2006),
Overesch and Wamser (2006) and Overesch and
Wamser (2009). In contrast to empirical pub-
lic finance papers that are often lacking a suffi-
cient theoretical foundation or do not account for
all relevant tax details (Desai, Foley, and Hines
2004; Mintz and Weichenrieder 2005; Huizinga,
Laeven, and Nicodème 2006; Weichenrieder and
Windischbauer 2008) we provide a detailed the-
oretical model. Moreover, future empirical papers
could verify whether the optimal financing and
dividend policies we derive are actually practised.
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We consider thin capitalization rules that are char-
acterized by a given permitted debt-equity capital
ratio because many countries limit debt financing
referring to such a permitted ratio. We take the
Italian, German, and Belgian rules as examples to
study their impact on capital structure decisions.
The Italian and the German thin capitalization
rules are no longer in force. They have been substi-
tuted by rules that restrict interest deduction irre-
spective of apermitteddebt-to-equity ratio in those
countries. Nevertheless, there are many countries
that apply this type of thin capitalization rule,
e.g., Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We re-
fer to Belgium, Germany, and Italy as examples
to model all major characteristics of this type of
thin capitalization rule. These examples allow us
to elaborate the mechanisms at work for different
implementations of such rules that are common
or discussed in several countries and to show how
they interact with different tax systems.
Our analysis can help investors not only to make
their dividend and financing decisions under thin
capitalization rules with a given permitted debt-
equity ratio but also to adjust their decisions when
tax laws change. Our analysis is representative of
all thin capitalization rules that refer to such a
permitted debt-equity ratio.
As the financing behavior of investors is crucial for
designing thin capitalization rules and as the influ-
ence of thin capitalization rules depends on several
other tax parameters (corporate tax rate, taxable
fraction of dividends and capital gains, permit-
ted ratio of debt to equity capital) it is important
for the treasury to know how these rules inter-
act. Analyzing different types of thin capitalization
rules and performing sensitivity analyses help the
treasury to implement a rule that contributes to
a given political aim. Thus, the following investi-
gation of different settings of thin capitalization
rules and tax systems is of general relevance for
a comprehensive understanding of tax effects on
capital structure decisions.
After developing the general model we apply our
model to selected countries. We refer to the capital
structure model by Miller (1977). Miller investi-
gates the market for debt capital and shows that
thismarket always leads to an equilibrium inwhich
for every company the capital structure is irrele-
vant to the value of the firm. The same after-tax
return arises irrespective of the form of financing
because this balances out the advantage that debt
capital incurs interest payments that aredeductible
from the corporate tax base (tax shield) and the
advantage that equity capital typically leads to rela-
tively lower income tax burden (Miller 1977: 269 et
seq.).
In section 2 we develop a framework for a gen-
eral capital structure model on the basis of Miller
(1977) that includes thin capitalization rules. We
integrate the Italian, German and Belgian thin
capitalization rules into this model in sections 3
to 5 and analyze whether a Miller equilibrium can
emerge. If not, we determine the optimal capital
structure and identify the most important value-
driving factors. On the basis of Miller (1977), we
refer to a single investor’s indifference towards
providing capital as a loan or as equity capital to
a corporation as a ‘‘Miller equilibrium’’. Note, that
in the following, this ‘‘equilibrium’’ is not a general
market equilibrium. In section 6 we summarize
and draw conclusions.
This article is supplemented with Excel spread-
sheets that provide the calculations that have been
performed for Belgium, Italy, and Germany.1




In the following we integrate thin capitalization
for shareholder debt financing into Miller’s cap-
ital structure model to derive conclusions about
the effectiveness of this regulation for financing
decisions in corporations. Our model relies on the
following set of assumptions.
Weassumeaperfect capitalmarket under certainty
and identical debit and credit interest rates. The
borrower is a domestic corporation. The investors
are assumed to be domestic individuals who hold
their investment and accordingly the provided cap-
ital in private means. On the corporate level taxes
on profits are considered. On the shareholder level
the individual income tax is taken into account.
All investors who have to decide to provide either
equity or debt capital are assumed to be share-
holders of the underlying corporation. Further we
1 These Excel files can be downloaded from www.business-
research.org.
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assume that the thin capitalization rule applies
to all shareholders and thus to all investors (see
Appendix A2).
The interest payment Z amounts to i C, where
i denotes the market rate of return that can be
earned on the capital market and C denotes the
amount of debt capital provided by an investor.
On the corporate level dividends are not tax-
deductible, whereas interest payments on debt are
generally tax-deductible as they are operating ex-
penses. In line with Miller, the case of limited
interest deductibility, particularly due to losses, is
not considered (Miller 1977: 262). We assume that
a fraction α of debt is subject to the thin capi-
talization rule (see Appendix A2). The permitted
debt-to-equity ratio will be denoted by μ and is
assumed to be exceeded. Consequently, not the
total amount of interest paid to a shareholder is
deductible, but only the interest on the permitted
fraction of debt capital multiplied with the corpo-
rate equity, thus iμ E. As the thin capitalization rule
applies to all shareholders, the shareholder’s share
in corporate equity is irrelevant. In the following
the deductible amount of interest is denoted as the
utilized safe havenH. Hence,
(1) H =
{
iμ E, if αC > μE;
αi C, if 0 ≤ αC ≤ μE.
Equity capital E provided by the shareholder de-
notes the equity capital that has already been pro-
vided prior to the point of time when the financ-
ing decision is made. The investor’s individual
amount of equity is exogenously given. Further, it
is assumed that all investors offer the same mix
of equity and loans to the corporation and con-
sequently all shareholders have an identical safe
haven. It is therefore possible to determine the
overall safe haven for all shareholders jointly. It is
not necessary to refer to the single shareholder.
Some countries raise additional taxes on profits
on the corporate level. National tax rates and tax
bases vary significantly. In the following the tax
rate of these taxes is denoted by τa, the tax base by
F .
Under income tax law, earned interest is taxable at
a fraction εwith ε ∈ [0,1]. The capital income from
shareholders’ invested equity capital consists of
distributed dividends of the corporation and real-
ized capital gains. The taxable fraction of dividends
D is denoted as γ with γ ∈ [0,1].
In the following the sum of retained earnings is
given by G (Miller 1977: 268). G is not equal to
capital gains as this variable neglects the internal
growth caused by reinvesting retained earnings at
the internal after-tax yield i(1 − τc − τa). Further,
capital gains are not liable to income tax until they
are realized at shareholder level. We have to take
account of the time effect arising from the delayed
taxation of retained earnings. In the following,
the time lag of capital gains taxation compared to
dividend taxation and the internal growth effect
from retained earnings are both captured in the
factor θ > 0. It is necessary to implement θ into our
static model to highlight the difference in taxation
of dividends and capital gains and the internal
growth of retained earnings in present value terms.
We obtain
(2) θ =
(1 + i[1 − τc − τa])n
(1 + iτ)n
,
withθGdenoting thepresent value of capital gains.
We abstract from increases in value that are caused
by speculative developments. Here, iτ is the after-
tax market rate of return that the shareholder is
able to earn alternatively on the capital market and
is given by iτ = (1 − τiI)i. τiI denotes the investor’s
personal tax rate on interest income. If interest
income is included in the investor’s individual
tax assessment, the tax rate τiI is equal to the
investor’s personal income tax rate τi. If there is
a withholding tax on interest income, τiI is the
withholding tax rate. The variable n denotes the
period in years after which the capital gains are
realized. We assume that n is exogenously given
and hence the investor is not able to decide on the
holding period n. Furthermore, we assume that
only a fraction λ of the capital gain is taxable. In
total the present value of assessable and taxable
capital gains G is λ θG (see Swoboda 1991: 857,
and Laß 1999: 119, who assume that capital gains
are tax-exempt).
We abstract from personal allowances, income-
related expenses, standardized deductions, per-
sonal exemptions, special expenses and extraordi-
nary charges in themodel when calculating taxable
income. We assume there is no income from other
sources apart from interest income, dividends, and
capital gains. The fractionof interest that is not tax-
deductible on the corporate level is requalified as
hidden profit distribution and therefore treated
as a dividend. Dividends and hidden distributions
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are subject to an income tax rate τiD, interest pay-
ments to an income tax rate τiI and capital gains
to τiG. Although the income tax schedule is pro-
gressive in many countries, from the shareholders’
perspective the income tax rate can be regarded as
exogenously given.
2.2 Integrating taxes
Now we will formally describe all relevant fiscal
rules. In a first step we have to determine the
amount of interest that can be deducted when de-
termining the corporate tax base. In total, interest
payments amounting to I are paid to the investor:
(3) I = i C.
The interest payments can be deducted from the
corporate tax base up to an amount of Id. Interest
payments on a fraction (1 − α) of the loans are
completely deductible, i.e., I(1 − α), whereas in-
terest payments on a fraction α of debt are only
deductible in the amount of the safe haven H. As
we assume the safe haven to be exceeded, it is equal
to iμ E.
(4) Id = I(1 − α) +H = i C(1 − α) + iμ E.
The amount of non-deductible interest expenses
Ind which is requalified as a hidden distribution of
profits is
(5) Ind = I − Id = i Cα − iμ E.
The taxable income in terms of corporate tax re-
sults from the deduction of debt-capital interest Id
from gross profit Π. Corporate tax amounts to:






Π − i C[1 − α] − iμ E
)
.
Additional taxes on profits Ta are levied on the
corporate level. The tax base is equal to F; the tax
rate amounts to τa.
(7) Ta = τa F .
The taxable interest Itaxable, dividendsDtaxable, and
capital gains Gtaxable are subject to income tax.
Additionally, interest that is considered to be a
hidden distribution of profits is subject to income
tax. The taxable fraction of the hidden distribution
of profits is denotedwith Btaxable. Thus, the burden
resulting from income tax is






The interest payments that are subject to income
tax are identical to the deductible interest pay-
ments Id on the corporate level. A fraction ε of Id
is taxable. Hence, the interest payments that are
liable to tax amount to
(9) Itaxable = ε Id = ε
(
i C[1 − α] + iμ E
)
.
Only the fraction γ of the dividends is subject to
income tax
(10) Dtaxable = γD.
Interest that is interpreted as hidden distribution
of profits is treated as dividends and thus likewise
taxable by the fraction γ. The hidden distribution
of profits corresponds to non-deductible interest
on the corporate level Ind. This amount denotes
the interest payments that exceed the safe haven.
(11) Btaxable = γ B = γ Ind = γ
(
i Cα − iμ E
)
.
Retained earnings G result from the difference
between the profit Π, the corporate tax Tc and the
additional taxes Ta, as well as the dividends D and
the interest I. Thereby, the present value of the
capital gains θG is taxable at the fraction λ. In
present value terms we obtain
Gtaxable = λθ
(
















Inserting equations (9), (10), (11), and (12) into eq.
(8) leads to
Ti = τiI ε
(













Π − i C(1 − α) − iμ E
]




The total after-tax income of all investors Πτ is
composed of the difference of the gross profit Π,
corporate tax Tc, additional taxes on the corporate
level Ta and income tax Ti,
(14) Πτ = Π − Tc − Ta − Ti
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Πτ = Π − τc
(


















Π − i C(1 − α)
−iμ E
]




Similar to Miller (1977), to identify the optimal
capital structure based on the total after-tax in-
come of all investors, we first have to determine
the optimal dividend policy. In a second step we
analyze the optimal capital structure. Against the
background of the set of equations outlined above,
we are able to investigate both an optimal dividend
policy and an optimal capital structure under thin
capitalization rules in a general capital structure
model. Furthermore, analyzing the general setting
enables us to draw conclusions about a real-world
example, i.e. Italy. This is possible as the Italian
thin capitalization rules are fairly simple and thus
correspond to those of our general model. Later,
we specify the model in more detail to study the
implications of modified and simultaneously more
complex thin capitalizations rules. Such rules have
been introduced in several countries. We take Ger-
many and Belgium as examples of such modified
rules and investigate whether the results of the
general model are robust under more complex
shareholder financing rules.
3 General thin capitalization rules
(Italy)
3.1 Critical income tax rate
In the following, we integrate general thin cap-
italization rules into our capital structure model.
Looking for corresponding real-world ruleswe find
that the rules in section 98 of the Italian Income
Tax Code fully comply with our general model.
These rules, which are characterized by a small
number of attributes, no complicating exceptions,
and simple parameters, can be regarded as an
illustrating example of our general setting. We
implement these rules into our framework to in-
vestigate the influence of thin capitalization rules
on a general basis on investors’ financing decisions
(see Appendix A1).
Under section 98 of the Income Tax Code interest
on debt capital that a corporation receives from a
substantial shareholder, i.e. a shareholder with a
shareholding of at least 25%, has to be requalified
as hidden distribution of profits if the permitted
ratio of debt to equity capital of currently 4:1 is ex-
ceeded (Romanelli 2006: 372). Therefore, interest
is not considered to be a hidden distribution until
the debt of a substantial shareholder exceeds four
times their equity share.
Additionally, a regional tax on productive activities
(IRAP) is levied on the net value of the production
F . In line with IRAP interest expenses are not
tax-deductible. The tax rate τa currently stands at
4.25% (Romanelli 2006: 367 et seq.).
Dividends and capital gains are 60% tax-exempt if
the shareholder holds either 2% of voting power
or 5% of the capital of listed companies, or if
they hold 20% of voting power or 25% of the
capital of other companies. Otherwise dividends
and capital gains are liable to a final withholding
tax of 12.5% (Romanelli 2006: 377). Aswe consider
substantial shareholders only, a withholding tax is
not applicable.
Interest income arising from loans is subject to a
withholding tax of 12.5% that is creditable against
the shareholder’s income tax liability. A final with-
holding tax applies to interest on current accounts
with bank offices and bonds, but not on loans
(Romanelli 2006: 378).
Hence, interest payments, dividends, and capital
gains are subject to the same income tax rate
τi = τiI = τiD = τiG.
This reduces the net profit given by equation (15)
to
Πτ = Π − τc
(


















Π − i C(1 − α)
−iμ E
]




To identify the optimal dividend policy, equation
(16) has to be differentiated with respect to divi-




= τi(λθ − γ) = 0.
We find an investor to be indifferent towards div-
idend policy only in two cases, namely if their
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marginal income tax rate τi amounts to τi = 0 or if
the factor θ amounts to θ = γλ .
The condition τi = 0 is only fulfilled if the investor
has no taxable income. Since we assume that the
investor obtains interest payments and dividends
and/or capital gains, this condition is not fulfilled
in our model. Hence, dividend policy is irrelevant
only if θ = γλ . Under current legislation we have
γ = λ which leads to θ = 1. The time and growth ef-
fects from capital gains are cancelled out perfectly
and thus θ = 1. This is true only if the corporate
internal after-tax yield i(1 − τa − τa) is identical to
the after-tax market rate of return the shareholder
is able to earn on the capital market iτ. Beyond this
setting, dividend policymay not be irrelevant. That
said, full retention is always the optimal dividend
policy. As long as retained earnings are taxed at
a lower effective rate than distributed earnings,
full retention of profits always leads to the highest
net profit. The same result is achieved by Miller
although he does not outline it explicitly. Miller’s
results are explained by Swoboda (1991: 853) and
Laß (1999: 45-46), who find a different result for
the German tax code. Both base their assumptions
on a split corporate tax scale in connectionwith the
full imputation system. From the authors’ point of
view the optimal dividend policy depends on the
ratio between the personal income tax rate and the
corporate tax rate that is applied when profits are
retained. If the personal tax rate is significantly
lower than the corporate tax rate, a distribution of
profits is beneficial to reduce the tax burden from
the corporate tax rate applied to retained profits
to the lower personal income tax rate (Laß 1999:
139-140).
To identify the optimal capital structure based on
the optimal dividend policy, equation (16) has to be
differentiated considering D* = 0 with respect to
C. Rearranging finally leads to the critical income












C[1 − α] + μE
)










Note that the factor θ is influenced by the after-tax
interest rate iτ and therefore by τ*i . Nevertheless,
we assume that θ is exogenously given. To justify
this simplification we have analyzed the interde-
pendency of θ and τ*i using an iterative simulation
(see Appendix A2). By means of equation (18) the
optimal financing decision can be determined for
every investor. All investors whose marginal tax
rate τi equals the critical income tax rate τ*i are in-
different towards the allocation of debt and equity
capital. They are referred to as marginal investors.
Investors who have lower tax rates will offer a loan
to the corporation, while investors with higher tax
rates will offer equity capital (Swoboda 1991: 853).
Due to the progressive income tax scale in many
countries, e.g., in Italy (Romanelli 2006: 378),
a general irrelevance of the financing policy can
never be achieved for all taxpayers. Irrelevance
can only be achieved for the taxpayers who have
marginal tax rates that are identical to the critical
income tax rate. Therefore, within this analysis it is
only possible to investigate whether or not aMiller
equilibrium can be reached for specific taxpayers.
Furthermore, the after-tax profit of a firm can
never be maximized through mixed financing. De-
pending on the single parameters, either an equity-
only or debt-only financing maximizes after-tax
profit, or themeans of financing is irrelevant to the
after-tax profit of the firm.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis
In the following we analyze the implications of a
variation of different model parameters. Changes
in gross profit Π and interest rate i do not influ-
ence the critical income tax rate and therefore the
financing decision. Hence, we concentrate on the
factor θ, the tax rates, the taxable fraction of divi-
dends γ and capital gains λ, the fraction α of debt,
the taxable fraction of interest ε, and the permitted
ratio of debt to equity μ.
3.2.1 Time and growth factor for capital
gains
To analyze how the different parameters affect
the investor’s financing decisions, all variables are
assumed to be constant, except for the factor θ.
We assume
τc = 33%; τmaxi = 43%;
C = e 100,000; E = e 1,000;
γ = λ = 0.4; μ = 4; ε = 1; i = 6%; α = 1.
Interest payments are fully tax-liable, hence ε = 1.
Dividends, hidden distributions, and capital gains
are subject to a shareholder relief system, i.e. they
are all subject to tax at a fraction of 40% (Romanelli
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2006: 377). Hence, in our model we obtain γ = λ =
0.4. As the permitted ratio of debt to equity capital
is 4:1, in our model the debt-equity parameter μ
is equal to 4. All interest payments to substantial
shareholders are subject to the thin capitalization
rules (Romanelli 2006: 372). These regulations
imply α = 1.
Then, the investor receives interest payments of
e 6,000 and the safe havenH amounts to e 240.





Table 1: Critical income tax rates for












Table 1 shows that the values for the critical in-
come tax rate τ*i vary between 3.14% and 800.19%
(see Appendix A2). For θ = 1.07 we receive an
extremely high critical income tax rate that again
indicates that debt financing is always beneficial.
If we determine critical income tax rates for higher
values of θ the critical tax rate may change its sign
and even become negative. A negative critical in-
come tax rate is not easy to interpret. A closer look
at these scenarios clarifies that the basic mech-
anisms at work do not change. In line with the
result for θ = 1.07 the resulting (negative) criti-
cal tax rate again implies that debt financing is
generally favorable.
If θ > 0.9964, the critical tax rate is higher than
the top tax rate of 43%. In these cases an equilib-
rium is not possible for the underlying tax system.
Then, investors will always prefer to provide a loan
instead of equity to the corporation leading to the
highest possible net profit Πτ.
If θ < 0.9288 the critical income tax rate is lower
than the minimum tax rate of 23%. In these cases
all investors provide equity capital.
Only if 0.9288≤ θ ≤0.9964 will it depend on the
investor’s individual income tax rate whether debt
or equity financing is optimal. If the personal in-
come tax rate is lower than the critical tax rate, the
investor will offer a loan. If it is larger, they will
provide equity capital. If the marginal tax rate is
equal to the critical income tax rate, the investor
is indifferent to either option. In this case we find
the so-called Miller equilibrium for this investor.
Although at first sight the after-tax internal rate
of return falls short of the after-tax external rate
of return (θ < 1) shareholders are still willing to
provide equity capital as they benefit from prefer-
ential capital gains taxation. The time and growth
factorθdoes not reflect effects arising from the tax-
able fraction of capital gains λ < 1. Consequently,
providing equity capital can be optimal even for
θ < 1.
The specific outcome of the factor θ mainly de-
pends on the ratio of the internal after-tax yield
i(1 − τc − τa) and the after-tax market rate of return
iτ. The holding period n exerts only little influence
on θ. Assuming that i(1 − τc − τa) and iτ are al-
most equal, leads to θ ≈ 1. Then we see that debt
financing will be beneficial for most investors.
Income from equity capital, namely dividends and
capital gains, is subject to income tax at a fraction
of γ = λ =0.4. By contrast, interest income is fully
taxed. Interest incomeamounting to the safe haven
is also fully taxable, while the excess is subject to
tax to a fraction of γ =0.4. The lower taxation
of dividends and capital gains on the shareholder
level compared to interest income usually over-
compensates their non-deductibility on the corpo-
rate level. Nevertheless, debt capital often is more
advantageous than equity capital because income
from equity capital, i.e. accumulated capital gains,
is usually higher than interest income. Differenti-












An increase in θ causes a higher taxation of capital
gains and consequently a higher taxation of equi-
ty capital. Hence, the relative advantage of debt
capital increases compared to equity capital.
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3.2.2 Tax rates
A rise in the corporate tax rate has two counteract-
ing effects. On the one hand, the tax advantage of
debt capital (tax shield) at the corporate level in-
creases and so does the relative advantage of debt
capital (see Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber, and
Wamser 2006: 11, who come to the same conclu-
sion in the case of financing a German corporation
owned by foreign shareholders). Equity capital is
more burdened by a higher tax rate, as dividends
are not tax-deductible on the corporate level. On
the other hand, the factor θ decreases because the
corporate internal after-tax yield i(1 − τc − τa) de-
clines. A decrease in θ leads, as shown above, to an
increasing relative advantage of equity capital. In
Italy the tax-shield effect always dominates, caus-
ing an overall increasing advantage of debt capital.






A change in the corporate tax rate has a relatively
low impact on the investor’s financing decision.
Assuming a holding period of, e.g., n = 10 years,
a decrease in the tax rate from 33% to 10% leads
to changes in the critical income tax rate of 9
percentage points. By contrast, an increase in the
corporate tax rate to 50% raises the critical tax
rates by 6 percentage points.
Varying the IRAP tax rate has no tax-shield effect
because interest payments are not deductible un-
der this tax. A change in the IRAP tax rate only
amends the factor θ such that the relative advan-




is always negative. E.g., assuming a holding period
of 10 years a rise in the tax rate from currently
4.25% to 10% decreases the critical income tax rate
from 12.57% to 3.11%.
3.2.3 Taxable fraction of dividends and
capital gains
In Italy dividends and capital gains are subject to
tax at the same fraction γ = λ =0.4. In this section
we analyze the effects of an isolated change in
the taxable fraction of dividends γ and the taxable
fraction of capital gains λ, respectively. We also
investigate the influence of a change in the taxable
fraction of both dividends and capital gains. A rise
in the taxable fraction of dividends γ leads to a
decrease in critical income tax rate and therefore







4,000 + 96,000γ − 39,472θ
)2 < 0.
This result, which seems surprising at first glance,
can be explained as follows:we have already shown
that companies do not distribute profits in this
model framework. Instead, payments for equity
capital are always realized as capital gains. If the
taxable fractionof dividends is increased, this leads
to a higher taxation of interest payments from thin
capitalization that have to be requalified as hidden
distribution of profits. Therefore, an increase in γ
implies a higher taxation of debt capital.
Correspondingly, an isolated increase in the tax-
able fraction of capital gains λ leads to a higher
taxation of equity capital and an increasing rela-
tive advantage of debt capital. The critical income








Focussing on a change in both the taxable fraction





−1.27 · 108 + 1.3 · 108θ(
4,000 + 1,000γ[9.6 − 9.9θ]
)2  0.
The derivative is positive or negative depending on




is zero if θ =0.9728. A negative derivative arises
if θ is smaller than 0.9728. Then, equity capital
becomes more attractive. The effect from higher
taxation of dividends that leads to an increased
advantage of equity capital is higher than the effect
from higher taxation of capital gains that causes




∂γ is positive if θ >0.9728. In these
cases the relative advantage of debt capital in-
creases. The effect of the higher taxation of capital
gains overcompensates the effect of the higher div-
idend taxation because a high value of the factor
θ additionally causes a higher taxation of equity
capital.
3.2.4 Fraction of considered debt
At present all interest payments to substantial
shareholders are subject to Italian thin capitaliza-
tion rules. Therefore, the parameter α has been set
equal to 1. Lowering the fraction α leads to a rise in
the critical income tax rate and hence an increas-
155
BuR -- Business Research
Official Open Access Journal of VHB
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V.
Volume 2 | Issue 2 | December 2009 | 147--169
Figure 1: Derivative ∂τ
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This effect is true because the interest payments
which are subject to thin capitalization and requal-
ified as hidden distributions of profit decrease, as
does the corporate tax. A reduction in the fraction
of considered debt α has a relatively high influence
on the critical income tax rate. A reduction from
α = 1 to α = 0.01 would lead to a rise in the critical
income tax rate of up to 32 percentage points.
3.2.5 Other model parameters
Assuming a decrease in the taxable fraction of
interest of ε = 1 to values with ε < 1, we obtain a
rise in the critical income tax rate. The derivative
∂τ*i
∂ε is always negative. This effect in turn increases
the relative advantage of debt capital because a
lower taxable fraction of interest implies a lower
taxation of debt capital.
The influence of the permitted ratio of debt to
equity capital μ and of the amount of equity cap-
ital E can be analyzed simultaneously since both
variables only affect the safe haven H = iμ E. The
multiple μE denotes themaximumamount of debt
capital that a substantial shareholder can provide
to the corporation while tapping the full potential
of the safe haven. An increasing multiple μE and
consequently an increasing safe haven H leads to
a decreasing corporate tax because the amount
of deductible interest payments increases. At the
same time the income tax increases because the ad-
ditionally deductible interest payments are taxed
to the full amount whereas hidden distributions
are only subject to tax at the fraction γ =0.4. The
effect on the corporate level always dominates.
Therefore, the relative advantage of debt capital
compared to equity capital increases with rising
μE. If the permitted ratio of debt to equity capi-
tal μ is increased, e.g., from 4 to 20, debt capital
may be twenty times the equity capital contributed
by one shareholder while a change in the criti-
cal income tax rate amounts to a maximum of 17
percentage points.
3.2.6 Results
We are able to show that except for the gross profit
Π and the interest rate i all model parameters have
an influence on the investors’ financing decisions.
Whereas the influence of the corporate tax rate,
the IRAP tax rate, the taxable fraction of dividends,
capital gains, and interest is low, the factor θ, the
fraction of considered debt, and the multiple μE
exert a high influence on financing decisions. As θ
ismainly driven by the relation of the corporate tax
rate to the individual income tax rate, obviously
the tax rate difference determines the financing
decision significantly if capital gains are taxable. A
closer look clarifies that θ can significantly change
the critical income tax rate whereas a change in the
corporate tax rate cannot. E.g., if the corporate tax
rate rises, two partial effects on the critical income
taxcanoccur.Oneeffect is an increase in the critical
income tax rate because of an increasing tax shield
from debt financing. Simultaneously the critical
income tax rate is reduced because of a decrease in
the factor θ. Consequently, the overall effect of a
rise in the corporate tax rate on the critical income
tax rate determined by these two opposing partial
effects is small. Only the influence of the taxable
fraction of dividends seems counterintuitive as a
rise in the taxable fraction of dividends γ causes a
rise in the attractiveness of equity capital.
Given the Italian tax policy with capital gains tax-
ation, the underlying thin capitalization rule with
a given permitted debt-to-equity ratio is typically
not irrelevant with respect to capital structure de-
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cisions. Here, financing decisions mainly depend
on the corporate-income tax rate differential and
therefore the parameter θ. Consequently, the tax
scale is an important driver of the financing deci-
sion. The treasury needs to know the distribution
of investors across tax classes to forecast whether
it is likely that the majority of investors will tend
to provide debt instead of equity capital under the
thin capitalization rules.
We find that changes in some model parameters
have a higher impact on the critical income tax
rates than changes in other parameters. This dif-
ference in sensitivity is due to the functional form
of the net profit.
Several countrieshave implementedmore complex
thin capitalizations rules. Against this background
and the results mentioned above, it is worthwhile
to find out whether we obtain corresponding or
deviating results undermore specified rules and to
what extent the characteristics of the underlying
tax systemdetermine the effects.We takeGermany
and Belgium as examples and perform an analysis
in the following sections.
4 Complex thin capitalization
rules (Germany)
4.1 Critical income tax rate
In this section we integrate the German thin cap-
italization rules according to section 8a of the
German Corporate Tax Code as amended by the
Korb II tax reform act (section 8a of the German
Corporate Tax Code as amended by the Korb II
tax reform act dated Dec. 22, 2003, BGBl. I 2003:
2841 et seq.) into the model. This rule that was
introduced in 2004 has been reformed by the Ger-
man business tax reform act 2008 where it was
substituted by an interest barrier (section 4h of the
Income Tax Code and section 8a of the German
Corporate Tax Code as amended by the German
Business Reform dated Aug. 14, 2007, BGBl. I
2007: 1913 et seq., 1927 et seq.). Section 8a is an
example of a complex thin capitalization rule char-
acterized by a given permitted debt-equity capital
ratio.
Under this debt-equity-ratio-based thin capitaliza-
tion rule, interest on debt capital that a corporation
receives from a shareholder with a shareholding
of more than 25%, under certain circumstances,
has to be requalified as a hidden distribution of
profits. This regulation only holds if the share-
holder’s capital commitment is long term and if
the tax allowance of e 250,000 of interest on debt
is exceeded. The permitted ratio of debt to eq-
uity capital is 1.5:1 (section 8a para 1 no. 2 of
the German Corporate Tax Code). As only interest
payments for long-term debt are subject to this
regulation, the parameter α represents the fraction
of long-term debt in Germany. The tax allowance
(section 8a para 1 of the German Corporate Tax
Code) of e 250,000 of interest is assumed to be
exceeded.
In addition to the corporate tax the German local
business tax has to be taken into account on the
corporate level. This tax treats equity and debt dif-
ferently. To integrate effects of the local business
tax into the model further assumptions are neces-
sary. Corporate income as defined in the German
Corporate Tax Code is the basis for determining
the local business tax base F (section 7 sentence 1
of the German Local Business Tax Code). Since the
local business tax itself is an operating expense, it
is deductible from its own tax base. We consider
this deductibility by introducing an effective local
business tax rate τa (see Appendix A1). Further-
more, amongst the various tax base adjustments
listed in section 8 of the German Local Business
Tax Code, only the addition of 50% of the interest
payments for long-term debt (section 8 no. 1 of
the German Local Business Tax Code) is consid-
ered in the model. Splitting debt into long-term
and short-term debt indirectly introduces a time
dimension into the model. Although we develop a
staticmodel that by definition does not account for
timing effects, a differentiation between long-term
and short-term debt is necessary to distinguish be-
tween different types of interest for local business
tax and thin capitalization purposes. Nevertheless,
the model remains static. Reductions according to
section 9 of the German Local Business Tax Code
are not considered at all. The fraction of the in-
terest that is long-term debt (section 8 no. 1 of
the German Local Business Tax Code) is denoted
by α ∈ (0,1]. If α = 0, section 8a of the German
Corporate Tax Code does not apply. Hence, the
addition of interest payments for long-term debt is
equal to 0.5 Id.
Dividends, hidden distributions, and capital gains
are subject to the same income tax rate τi = τiI =
τiD = τiG.
Taking into account the local business tax, the net
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profit Πτ is equal to (see Maßbaum and Sureth
2008 for a more detailed analysis of the influence
of the German section 8a thin capitalization rule
on capital structure decisions)
Πτ = Π−τa
[







Π − i C(1 − α) − iμ E
−τa
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Π − i C(1 − α)




Π − i C(1 − α) − iμ E
− τa
[
Π − iDC(1 − α) − 0.5 iμ E
])




To identify the optimal dividend policy, equation




= τi(λθ − γ) = 0.
We see that the investor is only indifferent towards
dividend policy in two cases, namely if the income
tax rate τi = 0or if the factor θ =
γ
λ . This is the same
result we obtained for Italy (see section 3.1 and
Appendix A2). Beyond these cases full retention is
always the optimal dividend policy.
To obtain the optimal capital structure equation
(25) has to be differentiated with respect to D* = 0
to C and it has to be set to zero. As a result we get










C(1 − α) + μE
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As in the general model, the gross profit Π and
the interest rate i have no influence on the critical
income tax rate and therefore on investors’ finan-
cing decisions. The other model parameters exert
an influence on the critical income tax rate. The
degree of sensitivity of the critical tax rate towards
variation in the different parameters varies signifi-
cantly. Therefore, we highlight the most important
value drivers.
4.2.1 Time and growth factor for capital
gains
To analyze the influence of the factor θ all other
model parameters remain constant. We assume
τc = 25%; τmaxi = 42%; τa = 16.28%;
C = e 100,000; E = e 1,000;
γ = λ = 0.5; μ = 1.5; ε = 1; i = 6%; α = 1.
We obtain the effective local business tax rate
τa by considering the average collection rate of
h = 389% (Federal Statistical Office 2007) and a
taxable business value ofm = 5%. As the permitted
ratio of debt to equity capital is 1.5:1, the parameter
μ is equal to 1.5. The fraction of long-term debt is
represented by the parameter α. Under income
tax law earned interest is fully taxable (section 20
para 1 no. 7 of the Income Tax Code), therefore
ε is equal to 1. The distributed profits D, hidden
distributions, and capital gains are subject to the
half-income system and thus only 50% of this
type of capital income is taxable, i.e. γ = λ =
0.5 (section 20 para 1 no. 1 in conjunction with
section 3 no. 40 d) of the Income Tax Code, see
Appendix A1).
The investor receives total interest I of e 6,000.
Within the safe haven interest of Id = H = e 90 is
tax-deductible at the corporate level.
Inserting the assumptions the critical income tax
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Table 2 shows the critical income tax rates for
different values of the factor θ (see Appendix A2).
Table 2: Critical income tax rates for










We see that the values for the critical income
tax rate vary between 0.93% and 197.04%. If the
factor θ is higher than 0.99845, the critical income
tax rate is higher than the top tax rate of 42%.
In these cases, debt capital is advantageous for all
shareholders. If θ is lower than0.95725, the critical
income tax rate is lower than theminimum income
tax rate of 15% and all investors will provide equity
capital. Only if 0.95725≤ θ ≤ 0.99845, it depends
on the investors’ marginal tax rate as to whether
debt or equity capital is favorable (section 3.2.1).
For θ = 1.015 we receive an extremely high criti-
cal income tax rate that again indicates that debt
financing is always beneficial. If we determine crit-
ical income tax rates for higher values of θ the crit-
ical tax rate may change its sign and even become
negative (see section 3.2.1 for an interpretation of
these effects).




equation (27)with respect toθ and inserting the as-
sumptions. As in the general model this derivative
is also positive in Germany. Therefore, an increas-
ing θ leads to an increasing relative advantage of









In Figure 2 we compare the German and Italian
critical income tax rates. We see that the German
tax rates areusually lower than the Italian tax rates.
Only if θ is higher than 0.9986 are the German tax
rates higher than the Italian. This implies that in
Germany equity capital is usually more attractive
in comparison to debt capital than in Italy. Only
if θ > 0.9986 is debt capital more attractive in
Germany than in Italy.
Figure 2: Critical income tax rates for
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Debt capital is usually less attractive in Germany
than in Italy, because debt capital is more severely
burdened due to the addition of a fraction of the
interest payments for long-termdebt for local busi-
ness tax purposes and the lower permitted ratio of
debt to equity capital. If the factor θ increases
this implies a higher effective taxation of capital
gains and consequently a reduced attractiveness
of equity capital in both Italy and Germany. As
the nominal taxation of capital gains λ is lower in
Italy than in Germany, equity capital becomes less
unattractive in Italy than in Germany.
4.2.2 Tax rates
A rise in the corporate tax rate τc incurs an in-
creasing critical income tax rate and therefore an
increasing advantage of debt capital over equity
capital. This result is in line with the result we
obtained for Italy (section 3.2.2).
By contrast, an increase in the local business tax
rate τa decreases the critical income tax rate and
therefore leads to an increasing relative tax advan-
tage of equity capital. In this case the tax shield
effect invoking a higher advantage of debt cap-
ital is lower than the opposing effect caused by
the negative impact of rising τa on θ, because in
Germany the fraction of interest payments that is
159
BuR -- Business Research
Official Open Access Journal of VHB
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V.
Volume 2 | Issue 2 | December 2009 | 147--169
tax-deductible with respect to the local business
tax is lower than for corporate tax purposes.
Assuming a holding period of n = 10 years ex-
emplifies that a decrease in the corporate tax rate
from 25% to 10% leads to a reduction in the critical
income tax rate of only 0.7 percentage points, a
corresponding increase in the corporate tax rate
to an increase of only 0.5 percentage points. Sim-
ilarly, changes in the local business tax rate also
only have a low influence on the critical income
tax rate. Assuming a decrease in the local business
tax to 10% raises the critical income tax rate by
0.2 percentage points, an increase to 30% results
in a change in the critical income tax rate of 0.3
percentage points.
4.2.3 Taxable fraction of dividends and
capital gains
As in Italy, in Germany dividends and capital gains
are subject to the same taxable fraction γ = λ.
An exclusive rise in the taxable fraction of divi-
dends γ, as in Italy, lowers the critical income tax
rate and therefore increases the relative advantage






(1,500 + 98,500γ − 49,767θ)2
< 0.
Analyzing c.p. an increased capital gains taxation,
i.e. an increase in λ, we obtain the following deriva-









A change in the taxable fraction of both dividends
and capital gains γ leads to a derivative that is,






-4.6 · 107 + 4.64 · 107θ
(1,500 + 98,500γ − 99,533γθ)2
 0.
The derivative is positive if θ is higher than 0.9896,
negative if θ is lower than 0.9896, and equal to
zero if θ is 0.9896. For Italy we obtain a similar
value of θ = 0.9728. Hence, the integration of the
local business tax and the different values of the
model parameters do not substantially affect the
influence of the taxable fraction of dividends and
capital gains on the critical income tax rate and
therefore on investors’ financing decisions.
4.2.4 Fraction of considered debt
Assuming a change in the fraction of considered











− 31,162θ − 18,605αθ
]-2
< 0.
In Germany only long-term debt capital is subject
to the thin capitalization rules of section 8a of
the German Corporate Tax Code. Therefore, the
investor can influence the parameter α by pro-
viding long-term or short-term debt, respectively.
Lowering the fraction of long-term debt leads to
an increasing relative advantage of debt capital
compared to equity capital.
4.2.5 Other model parameters
Considering changes in the taxable fraction of in-
terest ε and the multiple of the permitted ratio of
debt to equity capital and the amount of equity
capital μE we obtain the same influences as in
Italy (section 3.2.5).
A decrease in the taxable fraction ε of interest
leads to an increasing relative advantage of debt
capital. The first derivative ∂τ
*
i
∂ε is always negative.
Considering a rise in the multiple μE we obtain a
higher relative attractiveness of debt capital.
4.2.6 Results
To study the influence of the German thin capi-
talization rules on financing decisions we had to
extend the general model to include the local busi-
ness tax. This tax is quite different from the Italian
IRAP as the resulting tax burden depends on the
investor’s financing decision. In spite of the intro-
duction of this tax we obtain very similar results
for both Germany and Italy. We can show that in
both countries the gross profit and the interest rate
do not influence the investors’ financing decisions,
whereas changes in the other model parameters
exert the same influences in both countries. A
change in the German local business tax rate has a
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less severe influence on the critical income tax rate
than a change in the Italian IRAP tax rate because
interest payments are not tax-deductible under an
IRAP. For this reason a variation of the IRAP tax
rate does not invoke a tax shield.
5 Complex thin capitalization
rules (Belgium)
After having considered the Italian and German
thin capitalization rules we now analyze the in-
fluence of another debt-equity-ratio-based rule,
namely the Belgian regulation on shareholders’
financing decisions which was introduced in 1997.
In Belgium interest payments are requalified as
hidden distribution of profits and therefore treated
as dividends if the permitted ratio of debt to equity
capital of 1:1 is exceeded. The Belgian thin capi-
talization rules are applicable to all shareholders.
A minimum shareholding is not necessary. The
thin capitalization rules include all loans that a
shareholder provides the corporation (Offermanns
2006: 73).
A notional interest deduction for equity capital
is granted to corporations. Thus, the Belgian sys-
tem applies an Allowance for Corporate Equity
(ACE) device which was intended to account for
the distinction of interest payments to external
providers of capital compared to those from as-
sociated members of corporations. Introducing an
ACE was regarded as a step towards a more neu-
tral tax system and towards improving Belgium as
an investment location (Gerard 2006: 156). The
deduction is based on the book value of the com-
pany’s equity. It is calculated by multiplying the
equity by a fixed percentage determined by the
government. For 2007 the percentage is equal to
in = 3.442%. The notional interest rate is set by
the government on the basis of the interest rate
on 10-year government bonds (Cowley, Gutiérrez,
Kesti, and Soo 2008: 91).
In contrast to Italy and Germany, additional taxes
τa are not levied on the corporate level.
Dividends and interest income are subject to a
withholding tax of τiD = 25% and τiI = 15% re-
spectively (Offermanns 2006: 78). Alternatively,
the investor can choose to include dividends and
interest income into their individual assessment if
this leads to a lower taxation. In this case τiD = τiI .
In the following we analyze both cases, the sce-
nario with withholding tax in section 5.1 and with
individual assessment in section 5.2. We only con-
sider the case that the investor chooses to include
both interest and dividends into assessment. For
reasons of transparency we do not model mixed
scenarios.
Capital gains are not subject to tax, therefore
τiG = 0 (Offermanns 2006: 76). In a first step
we assume that capital gains are also subject to
the withholding tax of 25%. This assumption en-
ables us to isolate the effects of the introduction
of a capital gains tax. Hence, we assume that τiG =
25%.
5.1 Withholding tax
5.1.1 Critical income tax rate
Considering the withholding tax we assume
τiD = τiG = 25%; τiI = 15%.
We obtain the following net profit Πτ
Πτ = Π − τc
(

















Π − i C(1 − α)
−iμ E − in E
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By differentiating equation (34) with respect to the
dividends D the following dividend policy turns




= λθ − γ = 0.
The investor is only indifferent towards the div-
idend policy if λθ = γ. As capital gains are not
subject to tax in Belgium at present, we receive
λθ = 0. The condition only holds if γ = 0, namely
if dividends are not subject to tax. Since dividends
are fully taxable in Belgium, hence γ = 1 and in-
difference to the dividend policy is not possible at
present. Instead full retention is always the opti-
mal dividend policy. Because capital gains are not
subject to tax whereas dividends are, full retention
always leads to the highest net profit.
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Taking account of the withholding tax the income
tax rate is no longer a function of the tax base
but exogenously given, because τiI = 15% and
τiD = τiG = 25%. Thus, a critical income tax rate τ*i
cannot be determined. The optimal capital struc-
ture decision does not depend on the investor’s
marginal income tax rate but only on the values of
the other model parameters.
5.1.2 Sensitivity analysis
In the followingweanalyze the influenceof selected
model parameters on the investor’s financing de-
cisions.
For the basic scenario we assume
τc = 33%; τmaxi = 50%; in = 3.442%; i = 6%;
C = e 100,000; E = e 1,000; Π = e 10,000;
γ = 1; λ = 0; μ = 1; ε = 1; α = 1.
Corporations with a tax base up to e 322,500 are
subject to a progressive tax scale. Corporations
with a higher tax base are subject to a tax rate of
33% (Offermanns 2006: 65, see Appendix A1). We
assume that the tax base exceeds e 322,500. The
shareholders are subject to a progressive income
tax scale. The top tax rate τmaxi to the amount of
50% is imposed if the tax base exceeds e 31,700
(Offermanns 2006: 77, see Appendix A1).
Dividends, interest payments, andhiddendistribu-
tions are subject to income tax to the full amount,
hence ε = γ = 1. Capital gains are tax-exempt,
hence λ = 0. The thin capitalization rules are ap-
plicable for all loans provided by shareholders, i.e.
α = 1. The permitted ratio of debt capital to equity
capital is 1:1, i.e. μ = 1.
Inserting the assumptions into equation (34) we
obtain a net profit of e 6,711 in the case of equity
financing and a net profit of e 5,237 in the case of
debt financing. The investors will therefore decide
to provide equity capital instead of debt capital.
Payments for equity financing are only taxed with
corporate tax at 33%. In line with notional interest
deduction, a notional amount of interest can be
deducted from the corporate tax base. The pay-
ments for equity are not taxed on the shareholder
level because full retention is the optimal dividend
policy and capital gains are tax-exempt.
Interest payments are tax-deductible on the corpo-
rate level up to the safe haven. Those that exceed
the safe haven are non-deductible and therefore
subject to corporate tax of 33%. On the share-
holder level interest payments up to the safe haven
are subject to the withholding tax rate of 15%while
the excess is subject to the withholding tax of 25%.
Consequently, interest payments amounting to the
safe haven are possibly taxed lower than payments
for equity capital. But interest payments that ex-
ceed the safe haven are taxed considerably higher
(33% corporate tax plus 25% withholding tax).
Since we assume the safe haven always to be ex-
ceeded and since Belgium has a very low safe
haven, interest payments are always taxed higher
than capital gains.
As in Italy and Germany, a variation of the gross
profit and the interest rate has no influence on the
financing decisions. The same is true for changes
in the notional interest rate.
As long as capital gains are not subject to tax, i.e.
λ = 0, a change in the time and growth factor for
capital gains θ has no influence on the investor’s
financing decisions. If capital gains are not tax-
exempt, i.e. λ > 0, a variation of θ influences the
investor’s financing decisions. Since capital gains
are subject to tax at λθ, a change in the factor θ has
the same influence on the financing decisions as a
change in the taxable fraction λ.
As in Italy and Germany, an increasing corporate
tax rate leads basically to an increasing relative ad-
vantage of debt capital compared to equity capital
(section 3.2.2). The increasing relative advantage
of debt capital is very low, due to the notional in-
terest deduction for payments for equity capital. As
τc ∈ [0,1] an irrelevance of the financing decision
or even an advantage of debt capital cannot occur
in Belgium.
Investigating the effects of an isolated decreasing
taxable fraction of dividendswe find a rising attrac-
tiveness of debt capital (section3.2.3). The investor
is only indifferent towards debt and equity capital
if γ = -0.00038. As γ ∈ [0,1] a change in the tax-
ation of dividends does not change the financing
decision. Equity capital is always advantageous.
The introduction of a capital gains taxation, while
assuming that dividends are subject to tax to the
full amount, i.e. γ = 1, leads to an increased relative
advantage of debt capital (section 3.2.3).Neverthe-
less, debt capital would become advantageous only
for negative λ-values. As λ ∈ [0,1], equity capital is
always advantageous.
In Italy and Germany, a change in the taxable
fraction of both dividends and capital gains (γ =
λ) leads, depending on the value of the factor
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θ, to a change in the relative advantage of debt
over equity capital (section 3.2.3). In Belgium, a
change in these parameters does not change the
shareholder’s financing decision. A decreasing γ
and λ leads to an increasing relative advantage
of debt capital, but an advantage of debt capital
towards equity capital can only occur for negative
values of γ and λ.
A decrease in the fraction of considered debt from
presently α = 1 to α < 1 reduces the drawback of
debt over equity caused by the thin capitalization
rule (section 3.2.5). If α = 0.4242 the investor is
indifferent towards debt and equity financing. If
the tax law is modified accordingly, which is rather
unlikely, the net profit is identical for bothdebt and
equity financing. Only if the fraction of considered
debt is lower than 0.4242 do we find an advantage
of debt financing because then, net profit increases
with an increasing gearing rate.
A tax reform changing α directly to alleviate in-
terest deduction restrictions is very unlikely to be
discussed. It is more likely that thin capitalization
rules are alleviated by restricting their applica-
tion to long-term debt as is the case in Germany,
for instance. If the Belgian government only re-
ferred to interest payments on long-term debt in
their modified thin capitalization rules, a fraction
of long-term debt of 42.42% would be equal to a
fraction of α = 0.4242. In this case, the investor
can benefit from debt financing if their interest
on long-term debt does not exceed 42.42% of the
interest on short-term debt.
Given that interest payments are subject to tax to
the full amount, namely ε = 1, a decrease in the
taxable fraction ε leads to an increasing relative
advantage of debt capital. Concentrating on the
influence of a change in ε on the financing decision,
we find that the investor is indifferent towards debt
and equity financing if ε = -164. Since ε ∈ [0,1]
in fact an indifference cannot arise. Instead, the
investorwill alwaysprefer toprovideequity capital.
In contrast to Italy and Germany a change in the
permitted ratio of debt to equity capital μ and in
the amount of equity capital E cannot be analyzed
jointly, because a change in equity capital not
only influences the safe haven H = iμ E, but also
the notional interest deduction in E. Assuming an
increasing μ or an increasing E we obtain a rising
relative advantage of debt capital (section 3.2.5).
Capital structure irrelevance arises if μ is increased
to 58or if debt capital is increased to 104,000.Debt
capital will be preferred if μ > 58 or E > 104,000.
5.1.3 Results
Considering the Belgian thin capitalization rules in
the light of the withholding tax option, the finan-
cing decision, unlike in Italy and Germany, does
not depend on the investor’s marginal income tax
rate but only on the othermodel parameters. Vary-
ing different model parameters leads to similar
financing decision patterns as under the Italian-
type and German-type rules. Whereas in Italy and
Germany capital structure irrelevance is gener-
ally possible when assuming currently codified
tax rates and debt-to-equity ratio, providing eq-
uity capital is always favorable in Belgium because
capital gains are exempt from taxation, thin cap-
italization rules discriminate debt financing and
a notional interest deduction on equity capital is
granted. Although an ACE often is regarded as a
means to provide tax neutrality, in Belgium this
neutrality property has been undermined by intro-
ducing a thin capitalization rule, which obviously
exacerbates thediscriminationofdebt capital (Ger-
ard 2006: 156).
5.2 Assessment
5.2.1 Critical income tax rate
The shareholder can optionally include dividends
into the individual tax assessment. In this case
dividends and interest are not subject to the with-
holding tax of 25% or 15% but to the shareholder’s
individual income tax rate. Hence, the option to
include dividends or interest in the assessment is
only reasonable for shareholders with an income
tax rate less than 25% and 15% respectively. For
simplicity we only consider the case that the choice
to include income in the assessment is beneficial
for both dividends and interest.
If dividends and interest income are included in
the assessment, all sources of income are subject
to the same income tax rate. Therefore, we have
τiD = τiI = τiG = τi.
The net profit is thus equal to
Πτ = Π − τc
(
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− τiε
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Π − i C(1 − α)
−iμ E − in E
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We obtain the same optimal dividend policy as
for Italy and for Germany. The investor is only
indifferent towards debt and equity financing if
τi = 0, namely if they have no taxable income, or
if λθ = γ (section 3.1). Otherwise full retention is
always the optimal dividend policy.
We obtain the following critical income tax rate by












C(1 − α) + μE
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Just like in the other countries the gross profit and
the interest rates do not influence the investor’s
financing decisions. The other model parameters
influence the critical income tax rate and therefore
the financing decisions.
We assume
τc =33%; τmaxi =15%; in =3.442%; i=6%;
C = e 100,000; E = e 1,000; γ =1;
λ =0; ε=1; μ =1; α =1.
The top tax rate τmaxi is equal to 15% because only
shareholders with an income tax rate of less than
15% will decide to include dividends and interest
income in their individual assessment. Inserting
the assumptions into equation (37) we obtain
(38) τ*i = 0.33%.
All investors have a marginal income tax rate that
is higher than the critical income tax rate. To con-
clude for all investors we have to abstract from
the typically rather small group of investors with a
marginal income tax rate between zero and 0.33%.
Therefore, all investors prefer to provide equity
capital instead of debt capital. This result corre-
sponds to that obtained for the withholding tax
(section 5.1.2).
A variation of the factor θ has no influence on
the critical income tax rate because capital gains
are tax-exempt. Only if λ > 0 will a change in the
factor θ affect the investor’s financing decisions. In
these cases a change in this factor influences the
financing decisions in the same way as a change in
the taxable fraction of capital gains λ does.
In line with the results for the other countries,
we obtain a rising critical income tax rate and an
increased relative advantage of debt capital if we
assume a rising corporate tax rate (section 3.2.2).
Varying the taxable fraction of dividends γ while
assuming that capital gains are tax-free leads to a
negative derivative. We find that lowering γ causes








We obtain critical income tax rates higher than
15% and therefore an attractiveness of the with-
holding tax for interest income over the individual
assessment for γ < 0.0121.
Assuming a taxation of capital gains, i.e. λ > 0, and
a taxation of dividends to the full amount, i.e. γ =1,








As expected, implementing a capital gains tax in-
vokes a higher relative advantage of debt capital
(section 3.2.3). The effect of a rising λ on the critical
income tax rate is very low. We obtain critical in-
come tax rates of over 15%only for very high capital
gains taxes with only hypothetical relevance (λθ >
0.98124).
A change in the taxable fraction of both dividends
and capital gains (γ = λ) leads to the following
derivative that is a function of the value of the






60 + 5,940γ − 5,980γθ
)2  0.
If θ > 0.993, the partial derivative is positive. If
θ < 0.993, it is negative.
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As in the previously analyzed countries a decreas-
ing fraction of considered debt leads to an in-
creased critical income tax rate that implies an in-




∂α is always negative. Lowering the
fraction of considered debt α from 1 to 0.5 leads to
a rise in the critical income tax rate from 0.33% to
16.83%. Lowering α to 0.25 leads to τ*i = 25.08%.
If α = 0.5, the investor therefore will decide in
favor of the withholding tax for interest income. If
α = 0.25, they will prefer the withholding tax for
dividends.
Decreasing the taxable fraction of interest εwe find




∂ε is always negative.
A rise in the permitted ratio of debt to equity
capital μ or the amount of equity capital E leads
to an increase in the relative advantage of debt





∂ E are always
positive (section 3.2.5). To obtain a critical tax rate
of more than 15% the permitted ratio of debt to
equity capital has to be increased to 46:1 or debt
capital has to be increased to e 46,000.
5.2.3 Results
Assuming assessment is attractive for investors,
their financing decisions depend, as in Italy and
Germany, on their marginal income tax rate. The
different model parameters exert an influence on
the decision that corresponds to the one identi-
fied for the other countries. As in the case of the
withholding tax, equity capital is always beneficial
when considering currently codified tax rates and
debt-to-equity-capital ratio because capital gains
are exempt from taxation and a notional inter-
est deduction is granted for equity capital. If the
thin capitalization rule was abolished we would
obtain a critical income tax rate that is equal to the
corporate tax rate. This result is in line with the
neutrality property of an ACE tax and implies that,
given the assumption of a perfect capital market,
we lose capital structure irrelevance as soon as the
income tax rate differs from the corporate tax rate.
The analysis of theBelgian tax systemclarifies that,
given a neutral corporate tax, the political aim to
foster equity financing and prevent a drain of tax
revenues due to debt financing, a thin capitaliza-
tion rule with a given permitted debt-to-equity
ratio may help to achieve this aim irrespective of
the investors’ income tax rates.
6 Conclusions and future research
From a tax planner’s point of view, it is often
attractive to choose debt over equity financing.
Nevertheless, corporations issue shares as well as
debt, raising the question on possible causes. As
individual tax planning has led to an increase in
debt financing of corporations, many countries
have introduced thin capitalization rules to secure
their tax revenues. These thin capitalization rules
might explain why corporations still issue both
debt and equity.
Against this background we investigate how such
regulations affect the capital structure decisions
of stockholders of corporations. We examine gen-
eral thin capitalization rules and more specific
and complex examples of regulations to restrict
shareholder financing as to their impact on financ-
ing decisions of shareholders of corporations. The
general case is exemplified by the Italian rules of
the 2007 tax law and the more specific regulations
are illustrated by the examples of the German and
Belgian thin capitalization rules of the 2007 tax
law. The selected rules can be regarded as repre-
sentative examples ofmany countries’ thin capital-
ization rules that are characterized by a permitted
debt-to-equity ratio. As a corresponding regulation
exists in several countries, the knowledge gained
in our study can be used as the basis for follow-up
empirical studies on the impact of thin capitaliza-
tion rules on capital structure decisions in these
countries.
Furthermore, as the financing behavior of in-
vestors is crucial for designing thin capitalization
rules and as the influence of thin capitalization
rules depends heavily on a lot of other tax param-
eters (corporate tax rate, taxable fraction of div-
idends and capital gains, permitted ratio of debt
to equity capital) it is important for the treasury
to know how these rules interact. Our results help
the treasury to implement a rule that contributes
to their given political aim in a given tax setting.
Taking into account the relevant tax rates and the
codified debt-equity ratio we find similar results
for Italy and Germany. In particular, a so-called
Miller equilibrium is possible when the difference
of the corporate tax rate and the individual in-
come tax rate is relatively low and when the pro-
videddebt comprises a small fraction of considered
debt. The fraction of considered debt is presently
only limited under the German-type rule because
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there only long-term debt is taken into account.
In Belgium equity capital always incorporates an
advantage considering current tax rates and the
current debt-to-equity-capital ratio because even
though Belgium has introduced a supposedly neu-
tral ACE tax debt capital is discriminated by a thin
capitalization rule. This result holds in the case of
both withholding tax and assessment.
Investigating changes in the model parameters we
obtain similar results for all underlying tax sys-
tems. In particular, varying the fraction of consid-
ered debt as well as the ratio of corporate tax rate
and income tax rate and the permitted ratio of debt
to equity capital have a substantial impact on the
critical income tax rate and make a Miller equi-
librium possible. Among these parameters, only
the permitted ratio of debt to equity capital and
the tax rates can be influenced by the legislator.
The remaining parameters can be changed by the
taxpayers themselves.
There is a broad range of issues that should be
addressed in future research. Although the present
analysis only focuses on individual shareholders,
corporate shareholders can easily be integrated
into the model by changing the denotation ‘‘in-
come tax’’ to ‘‘corporate tax’’ on the shareholder
level and changing the values of the taxable fraction
of dividends γ and capital gains λ in the sensitiv-
ity analysis. As thin capitalization rules, especially
in Europe, are applicable to both domestic and
foreign investors, for simplicity we focus only on
domestic shareholders. An extension of the model
with respect to international investors is possible.
Effects on financingdecisions arising from interna-
tional tax base or tax rate differentials are captured
in our sensitivity analysis in sections 3.2, 4.2, 5.1.2
and 5.2.2. The basic results remain the same in
the international context. In the case of different
interpretations of income (dividend or interest in-
come) that has been requalified as dividends under
a thin capitalization rule we have to fall back on a
single-case analysis. General results can no longer
be deduced.
In 2008 both Germany and Italy (see Marino and
Russo 2008 for an overview of the new Italian
regulation) changed their thin capitalization rules
and implemented an interest barrier. Under Ger-
many’s 2008 business tax reform (section 4h of the
Income Tax Code and section 8a of the German
Corporate Tax Code as amended by the German
Business Reform dated Aug. 14, 2007, BGBl. I
2007: 1913 et seq., 1927 et seq.), in principle in-
terest payable is deductible up to an amount that
corresponds to the interest earnedby the company.
The residual interest payable can be deducted from
the tax base up to an amount of 30% of the residual
profit, plus depreciation and interest expenses and
less interest income. Interest expenses that remain
non-deductible according to this regulation have
to be carried forward and, subject to the same con-
ditions, increase interest expenses in subsequent
financial years. In this regard, the non-deductible
interest expenses are not classified as hidden dis-
tribution of profit. Hence, on the shareholder level
they are treated as interest income. The tax al-
lowance up to which the regulation is not applied
amounts to e 3,000,000. With respect to the in-
terest barrier, initially only statements about the
tendency can be made.
On the corporate level debt capital is advantageous,
because interest payments are at least partially tax-
deductible, whereas dividends and capital gains
are not. In contrast, on the shareholder level in-
terest income is fully taxable and subject to the
shareholder’s individual income tax rate (see Ap-
pendix A1). A withholding tax amounting to 25%
is on principle levied on dividends and capital
gains (see Kiesewetter and Lachmund 2004 who
investigate and demonstrate the effects of a final
withholding tax on the capital structure of enter-
prises with the help of investment appraisal and
who design, based on the achieved results, a with-
holding tax that is independent of the financing
form). The shareholder can also choose to include
dividends and capital gains in their assessment. A
substantial shareholder with a holding of at least
25% can additionally choose a shareholder relief
system for dividends and capital gains. In this
case they are subject to the shareholder’s individ-
ual income tax rate, but only taxed at a fraction
of 60%. The shareholder relief system is always
advantageous unless the shareholder exhibits an
individual income tax rate of 42%. To sum up, div-
idends and capital gains are usually lower taxed on
the shareholder level than interest income. Hence,
capital structure irrelevance is possible since the
lower taxation of income from equity on the share-
holder level counteracts the lower taxation of in-
come from interest on the company level caused
by the (partial) deductibility of interest payments.
If the capital company incurs losses over a longer
period and interest payments hence cannot be de-
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ducted in the same period, the attractiveness of
equity financing compared to debt financing in-
creases. In the extreme case, if interest on debt
cannot be deducted at all, equity financing always
generates the highest net profit.
To gain more precise results for Germany a quan-
titative analysis including all items of Germany’s
2008 Tax Reform Act is necessary. Furthermore,
an analysis of the new Italian thin capitalization
rules anda comparisonof the results of theGerman
and Italian regulation is reasonable. We relegate
this issue to future research.
For now, our analysis highlights that for com-
panies in countries with thin capitalization rules
and a permitted debt-equity ratio, debt financing
can typically be tax-optimized by shareholders.
However, under certain circumstances the capital
structure can become irrelevant.
Appendix
A1: Supplementary information on the
national tax laws
Belgium
TheBelgian thin capitalization rulewas introduced
in 1997 and is still in force.
Belgium raises a surcharge of 3% of the corporate
tax. We neglect this surcharge.
Belgium raises local surcharges on the income tax.
We neglect these local surcharges.
Germany
The German thin capitalization rule was intro-
duced in2004. It hasbeen reformedby theGerman
business tax reform act 2008 where it was sub-
stituted by an interest barrier.
From 2008 on the local business tax is not de-
ductible as an operating expense anymore.
The half-income system was abolished in 2009
and replaced by a final flat tax on capital income of
25%. A modified shareholder relief system is only
applicable to capital income from corporate shares
held as business assets. Substantial shareholders
with a shareholding of at least 25% can choose
between the withholding tax and the shareholder
relief system.
From 2009 on a withholding tax amounting to
25% is on principle levied on dividends and capital
gains. The withholding tax is not applicable to a
shareholding of at least 10% (see section 32d of the
Income Tax Code for an overview of the taxation
of income from equity capital).
Italy
Weconsider Italy’s thin capitalization rule in 2007.
For an overview of this regulation see, for example,
Gusmeroli and Russo (2004). This regulation was
introduced in 2004. In 2008 Italy replaced its
former rules with a regulation similar to the new
German interest barrier. See Marino and Russo
(2008) for an overview of this new regime.
A2: Supplementary information on the
analysis
We assume that the thin capitalization rule ap-
plies to all shareholders and thus to all investors.
The thin capitalization rule is for example appli-
cable to all shareholders in Belgium and Spain. In
many other countries, including Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and Portugal, thin capitalization
rules only apply to what are known as substantial
shareholders. These are shareholders with a given
minimum shareholding. Loans from third parties
and non-substantial shareholders can easily be in-
tegrated into the model. As interest payments to
third parties and to non-substantial shareholders
do not induce a thin capitalization treatment, these
extensions do not yield any new insights for our
analysis.
We assume that a fractionα of debt is subject to the
thin capitalization rule. In Germany the regulation
only applies to interest paid on long-term debt.
Other countries apply the regulation to all interest
payments to specific shareholders.
The values in Table 1 neglect that the factor θ
should be endogenously determined. As the influ-
ence of τ*i on θ cannot be derived analytically we
have to fall back on simulation. To point out that
the resulting changes in our results are very small
we have performed an iterative simulation. By it-
eration we can account for the interdependency
of τ*i and θ. We find that the resulting critical tax
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rates are slightly higher. At a maximum we iden-
tify a deviation of 3.75 percentage points from the
rates determined for an exogenously given θ. We
find similar deviations if we vary other model pa-
rameters. Against this background, it is acceptable
to conduct the following investigation abstracting
from this interdependency. We hence do not have
to fall back on numerical results on optimal cap-
ital structure; instead, analytical and thus more
general results can be obtained.
In Germany the investor is indifferent towards
dividend policy if the income tax rate τi = 0 or if
the factor θ = γλ . The condition τi = 0 is true if the
taxable income of the investor is lower than the
basic allowance ofe 7,664 for singles ande 15,328
for married couples (see section 32a of the Income
Tax Code).
The values in Table 2 neglect the influence of τ*i
on θ. By iteration we can show that the critical
tax rates are slightly higher. At a maximum we
identify a deviation of 0.6 percentage points from
the rates determined for an exogenously given θ.
We find similar deviations if we vary other model
parameters.
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